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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE
CITY, a public entity,
Plaintiff,
vs,
ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an individual
d/b/a the Pawn Shop, a Utah
corporation; and TERRY PANTELAKIS,
an individual d/b/a Jewelers &
Loans,

Case No. 880302-CA

Defendants/Appellants,
and
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D.
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE
BARROWS, et al•,
Defendants/Respondents.
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE
CITY, a public entity,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D.
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE
BARROWS; ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an
individual, d/b/a The Pawn Shop,
THE PAWN SHOP, a Utah Corporation;
JAMES ANDERSON, an individual,
d/b/a Jim's Ribs; TERRY PANTELAKIS,
an individual, d/b/a Jewelers
& Loans and sales, Inc., a Utah
corporation,

Case No. 880292-CA

Defendants/Appellants.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO REHEARING

The Respondent REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT . LAKE CITY
(hereinafter "RDA") respectfully upon request of the Court
submits its Responsive Brief to the Petition for Rehearing
filed by Appellants in this matter.
POINT I
THE COURT HAS FULLY CONSIDERED THE SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR REHEARING IN THE
EXHAUSTIVE DECISION FILED IN THIS MATTER.
The

arguments

addressed

by

the

Appellants

in

their

Petition for Rehearing of this matter entirely overlooked the
fact

that

this

Court

has determined

that

the

stipulated

agreement was, indeed, subject to two conditions precedent to
its efficacy.

Either the ADL would be signed by Lincoln

Property within thirty (30) days from the date of the Order
and additional sums of $76,450 would be paid into the Court or
the Defendant Landowners will have withdrawn all or part of
the $275,220 deposited with the Clerk of the Court.
The Appellants

entirely

overlook

the

Court's

lengthy

consideration of the fact that the contract and agreement were
subject

to

those

conditions

precedent did not occur.

precedent.

Those

conditions

Because they did not occur, the

Redevelopment Agency never obtained immediate occupancy of the
premises

and

they

also

never

obtained

by virtue

of the

Landowners' nonwithdrawal of the sums, any assurance that the
Landowners would not, at a trial on the merits of the case,
contest the RDA's right to condemn and acquire their property.

By virtue of the non-occurrence of either or both of the
conditions precedent, the RDA was faced with the proposition
that at the time of the trial on just compensation, the
Appellants herein were totally unrestricted in their ability
to

contest

domain.

the

right to acquire the property by eminent

Indeed, the RDA opened the trial of this matter by a

proffer of evidence designed to establish a prima

facie

case

of the right of the Agency to acquire the property.

That

entire presentation of evidence was itself required because
the Appellants herein had not withdrawn the deposited funds
and

had,

therefore,

condemnation

of

retained

their

their property.

right

to

Appellants

resist

the

Petition

for

Rehearing argues that the giving up of the owners' defense to
the Plaintiff's right to take constituted consideration for
which

they

should

deposited funds.

receive

the

interest

accruing

on

the

That argument simply fails because there is

nothing in the stipulation or the Order of Immediate Occupancy
that provided that if the funds were not withdrawn from the
Court or the Order of Immediate Occupancy became effective,
the RDA would obtain from the Landowners a relinquishment of
their right to contest the condemnation.
The

specific

provisions

of

the

Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy, based upon the oral stipulation of the parties
reads as follows:
2

(e)
g a s e c j U p 0 i i the ter ms and conditions of the
oral stipulation made to the Cour t, the Court does
hereby enter and Order of Immediate Occupancy that
the subject property is sought for uses by the
public in connection with and as part of a redevelopment project authorized and approved by the City
Council of Salt Lake City and the Redevelopment
Agency uf !;\ilt Lake city, and the plaintiff is
authorized to take immediate possession of said
property and continue in possession of the same
pending further hearing and trial on the issue of
just compensation which, subject to the terms and
provisions herein, is the only issue which may be
raised in this action as provided in Section 78-349, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
Plaintiff
or its agents may do such work thereon as may be
required for the purposes for which said property is
sought to be condemned including, but not limited
t o , demolition of existing structures, without
interference by defendants or any of defendants'
partners, agents, or employees, however, no demolition of the existing tenants pursuant to said Order
of Immediate Occupancy will occur until the defendants have either withdrawn part or all of the
$275,220.00 deposited with the Clerk of the Court as
provided herein or have received payment from David
Mortensen through the Redevelopment Agency
" '*
$76,450.00 as herein provided.
(R 237-238) (emphasis added)
A1
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. - > contest

Respondent
nun pin

Brief,
tunc

effective and pay the interest agreed to but with the attendant right to receive possession of and the income from the
property

retroactive

to

the

date the Order

of

Immediate

Occupancy was entered into subject to the conditions precedent.

But that offer was made only because in the Landowners'

opening brief they made the proffer to tender the rental of
approximately $43,000 in exchange for the interest of $58,000.
The RDA was attempting merely to compromise and settle the
issue.

The Court has determined, as a matter of law, that the

Order of Immediate Occupancy became ineffectual by the failure
of the conditions precedent.

It would not be within the

Court's prerogative to now retroactively enforce a proffered
settlement made by the RDA after the Appellants had taken
their best shot at an award which would include both and have
apparently lost.
POINT XI
THE ARGUMENTS RAISED CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
§11-19-23.9 INCLUDES EXPERT WITNESS FEES IN THE
DEFINITION OF COSTS HAS BEEN FULLY RAISED BY THE
APPELLANT IN THE ORIGINAL BRIEFS.
The

identical

arguments asserted

in the Petition for

Rehearing were briefed and presented to the Court on pages 3742 of the Appellants original Brief.

The Court's decision

regarding

the

costs

is

consistent

with

Supreme

Court's

decisions interpreting similar statutes and the decisions of
4

other jurisdictions which have considered this issue.

In

addition, it would be err for this Court to award the costs
requested

by Appellants

in this matter

since the statute

provides that those costs are permissive and discretionary
with the Trial Court.
Jones,

(See, J?edfevelopjnent Agency

of Roy v.

743 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah Ctp. App. 1987).)

It is also

respectfully submitted that the decision in People

v. Bowman,

343 P.2d 267, 269 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) and Andrews v.
Kingsbury

Gen. Improvement

Dist.

No. 2,

436 P.2d 813, 814-15

(Nev. 1968) are persuasive authority in support of Court's
decision.
For the Court's convenience a copy of the opinion on
which rehearing is sought as well as the Order of Immediate
Occupancy and the applicable statutory provision involved is
attached for the Court's reference.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^^

day of December, 1989.

/Wytf.
Harold A. Hintze
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake
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I hereby certify that I mailed a four copies each of the
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO REHEARING to the following:
B. Ray Zoll
5251 South Green Street #205
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Attorney for neighboring owners
John T. Evans
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
310 South Main St. #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellants/Defendants Burge, Barrows,
and Barrows
Jerome H. Mooney, III
Kyle Treadway
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants Daskalas, The Pawn Shop,
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Boston Building #800
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants Daskalas, The Pawn Shop,
and Pantelakis
on this
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day of December, 1989.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo
Redevelopment Agency of Salt
Lake City, a public entity.
Plaintiff/

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Ellen K. Daskalas, an
individual/ d/b/a The Pawn
Shop, a Utah corporation;
and Terry Pantelakis# an
individual, d/b/a AAA
Jewelers & Loans,
Defendants and Appellants,
and
Juanita Irene Burge; Robert D.
Barrows/ Jr.; Beatrice Irene
Barrows/ et al.#
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 880302-CA

FILED
Hoontn
0#rk"3j^w Court
U*t\ C#uit t< Appeals

Redevelopment Agency of Salt
Lake City, a public entity.
Plaintiff and Respondent/
Case No. 880292-CA

v.
Jyanita Irene 3yrge; Robert Pt

Bgrrpwgf jr t ; 3e9trj.ce Irene
Barrows: Ellen K. Daskalas, an
individual d/b/a The Pawn Shop;
The Pawn Shop, a Utah
corporation; James Anderson#
an individual d/b/a Jim's Ribs;
Terry Pantelakis, an
individual/ d/b/a AAA Jewelers;
and Loans and Sales, Inc., a
Utah corporation/
Defendants and Appellants.
Third District/ Salt Lake CountyHonorable Homer F. Wilkinson

EXHIBIT

Attorneys:

Brant H. Wall and Jerome H. Mooney, III, Salt Lake
City, for Appellants Daskalas, The Pawn Shop, and
Pantelakis;
John T. Evans, Salt Lake City, for Appellants and
Respondents Burge, Barrows and Barrows;
Harold A. Hintze, Provo, for Respondent
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City

Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Greenwood.
GARFF, Judge:
This consolidated case arises out of the attempt of plaintiff
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City (RDA) to condemn property
located on Block 57 owned by defendants Burge, Barrows, and
Barrows (Owners) and leased by defendants Daskalas, and
Pantelakis (Tenants). In Case No. 880302-CA, Owners appeal the
trial court's denial of (1) payment to them of interest on funds
deposited by RDA with the court, and (2) expert witness fees and
trial costs. In Case No. 870236-CA, Tenants appeal the trial
court's determinations (1) that Tenants had no compensable
leasehold interest at the time of the condemnation, and (2) that
Tenants are liable for Owners' attorney fees under their lease
agreements. We affirm in part, but remand for determination of
the amount of attorney fees.
About August 1, 1981, Tenants leased premises on Block 57
from Owners under separate but identical written lease
agreements. These agreements granted Tenants five-year leases
with options to renew for another five years, and contained
"condemnation clauses" which provided, in the event the property
was condemned, that the leases were terminable at will by either
party. The agreements also provided that Owners would receive
attorney fees if they were required to enforce the lease
provisions.
In connection with its role in redeveloping portions of
downtown Salt Lake City in 1984, RDA chose Lincoln Property
Company (Lincoln) to redevelop Block 57. By 1985, RDA had
acquired some property on the block, but not enough for Lincoln
to begin construction of the redevelopment project. Seven
landowners filed suit, separate from this action, contesting
their inclusion within the redevelopment area. The trial court,
in the separate action, ruled that RDA did not have authority to
condemn the property. This ruling created a serious impediment

ooftOA*)/^Q9-CA
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to Lincoln's ability to develop Block 57, and gave the landowners
who contested RDA's condemnation authority considerable
negotiating advantage, Lincoln became increasingly discouraged
with its ability to put together a sufficiently large
redevelopment site and indicated to RDA that it would continue
with the project only if it could be assured of acquiring the
entire northern one-third of Block 57. Meanwhile, many of the
other landowners on Block 57 were desperate to sell their rapidly
deteriorating property to Lincoln, and many had signed options to
that effect.
On June 21, 1985, RDA initiated the present condemnation
action against Owners and Tenants in an effort to insure that
Lincoln would have the property necessary to begin development.
RDA initially offered defendants $273,000.00 for the property,
which it stated was the property's fair market value.
RDA filed a motion for an order of immediate occupancy of the
premises on August 1, 1985. In response, Tenants' counsel
executed a stipulation consenting to RDA's occupancy of the
premises, based upon an agreement that Tenants could lease the
property back from RDA. Owners, however, filed an answer
objecting to the granting of the order of immediate occupancy,
alleging that RDA did not have the power of eminent domain nor
the need for immediate occupancy. Owners also claimed that
Tenants had no right to any award of compensation from RDA.
Tenants filed an answer, putting at issue the question of damages
only.
RDA's and Owners' motions were noticed up for hearing on
August 13, 1985. Tenants failed to appear at this hearing.
Nevertheless, RDA, Owners, and the neighboring landowners, who
were anxious to sell their property, stipulated to the entry of
an order of immediate occupancy. The court denied Owners' motion
for an award of expert witness fees and other trial preparation
costs and, despite Tenants' absence, incorporated into its order
the provisions of Owners' motion which stated that Tenants had no
right or claim to compensation.
The stipulation giving RDA immediate occupancy, entered by
the court on August 16, 1985, was contingent upon the following
requirements:
First, RDA was to deposit one hundred percent of the
property's appraised value, $275,220.00, with the court. This
money was to be invested at the rate of eleven and one-half
percent per annum while held by the court. Owners could withdraw
any portion of the deposited funds, plus interest, at any time,
but such a withdrawal would constitute a waiver of any and all

fi80302/292-CA
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defenses they might have as to RDA's ability to condemn the
property.
Second, RDA was to submit to Lincoln an agreement for
distribution of land for private development (ADL), which was to
be signed by both RDA and Lincoln within thirty days. Within
thirty days of the signing of the ADL, RDA was to pay to Owners
additional compensation of $76,450.00 from funds that would
otherwise have been paid to neighboring landowners. Even if
these events did not occur, the order would become effective if
Owners withdrew any of the funds deposited with the court, and
Owners would be required to immediately relinquish possession of
the property.
Tenants filed their answer on August 22, 1985, claiming an
interest in the deposited funds. On August 23, 1985, Tenants'
counsel objected to the portion of the August 16 order denying
Tenants compensation, alleging that he had not been properly
notified of the August 13, 1985 hearing. Owners answered
Tenants' objection, stating that they had hand-carried notice of
their motion to Tenants' attorney's new office at least five days
prior to the hearing and, even if Tenants had appeared, that they
would have had no right to participate in the condemnation
proceeds. Tenants' objection was noticed up for hearing on
October 11, and then was continued to November 1, 1985. The
court never ruled on Tenants' objection.
Meanwhile, on October 11, 1985, RDA filed a certificate of
readiness for trial. On October 25, 1985, Owners filed a motion
for summary judgment, asserting that Tenants were not entitled to
share in any condemnation award. Tenants opposed this motion,
arguing that they were entitled to the capitalized value of their
lease, known as "bonus value." The court heard Tenants' motion
on November 1, 1985, but continued Owners' motion for summary
judgment and, at Tenants' request, froze the funds deposited by
RDA with the court until Tenants' rights were determined.
Lincoln and RDA did not sign the ADL as provided for in the
August 16 stipulation, so the conditions set forth in the
stipulation never came about and the order of immediate
occupancy, dependent upon the conditions, never became effective.
On February 10, 1987, the court heard the issues between
Owners and Tenants and granted Owners' motion for summary
judgment, ruling, as a matter of law, that Tenants did not have
any compensable interest aside from the value of any improvements
they might have made on the property. The court also ordered
that Tenants pay Owners' attorney fees pursuant to the lease
agreements.

ftft0302/292-CA
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The issue of the fair market value of the property was
litigated in a jury trial which began on February 23/ 1987.
RDA had offered Owners $275/220.00 for the property/ but Owners
asserted that the property was worth $660/000.00. The jury
found that the property was worth $305/800.00. Tenants did not
appear and did not proffer any evidence as to the value of any
improvements they might have made to the property.
On March 15, 1987/ Owners moved: (1) for a new trial on
the issue of just compensation; (2) for the court to lift the
freeze on the money deposited with the court; and (3) for the
court to order that the money, including accrued interest/ be
paid to Owners. The court denied this motion and ordered that
the funds be returned to RDA. Consequently, Owners never
withdrew any of the funds deposited with the court pursuant to
the August 16, 1985 stipulation.
At this time# Tenants were still occupying the premises
and making rent payments to Owners under the terms of the lease
agreements. The court ordered Tenants to continue paying rent
to Owners until RDA obtained possession of the property.
On March 18/ 1987/ at the trial court's request/ Owners
submitted an affidavit setting forth their attorney fees
incurred in defending against Tenants1 claims. This affidavit
indicated that Owners' attorney spent 133 hours at $100.00 per
hour, for a total of $13/300.00, and itemized additional costs
and expenses of $2,130.00. Tenants filed an objection to the
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, order, judgment,
and affidavit.
On March 25, 1987, a hearing was held to determine the
amount of attorney fees that should be awarded to Owners. RDA
proffered evidence explaining its need for immediate occupancy
of the property because there was still a question as to
whether RDA had the power to condemn Block 57. Owners moved to
include as costs $18,402.67 of fees allegedly paid to five
expert witnesses, three of whom had been called to testify at
trial, and for an award of the interest on the funds deposited
by RDA pursuant to the order of immediate occupancy. The trial
court ordered RDA to pay Owners* court costs and attorney fees
incurred in establishing the fair market value of the property,
affirmed its order that Tenants were to pay Owners' attorney
fees incurred in defending the action against Tenants, and
found that Owners were entitled to rent payments until the
property was turned over to RDA. It denied Owners' requests
for payment of the interest accrued on the money filed by RDA
with the court pursuant to the August 16, 1985 stipulation, and
payment by RDA of Owners' expert witness fees and associated
expenses.

fifi0302/292-CA
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Owners then submitted supplemental affidavits supporting
their request for attorney fees and costs. Tenants filed an
opposing affidavit/ alleging that attorney fees for enforcement
of the lease provisions should not have exceeded $1/000.00.
On May 28/ 1987/ the court entered its conclusions of law,
but did not make any factual findings. It ordered that RDA pay
Owners $305/800.00 plus a reasonable attorney fee of $10/933.00
with interest/ and costs of $332.70. It found that Tenants
were not entitled to any compensation for their leasehold
interests but ordered that they could present evidence at trial
of any improvements made to the property for which they could
be compensated. It also ordered that Tenants pay Owners
$9/000.00 for attorney fees.
On May 28/ 1987/ the trial court denied Owners1 motion for
a new trial/ ordered Tenants to continue to pay rent to Owners
until RDA took possession of the property/ and awarded title to
the property to RDA upon its payment of $305/800.00 plus
interest and attorney fees to Owners.
On June 5# 1987/ Owners acknowledged that RDA had paid
them $305/800.00 plus $10/933.00 in attorney fees/ $833.05 in
interest/ and $332.70 in costs. That same day# the court
entered the final order of condemnation and RDA obtained
possession of the property.
Both Owners and Tenants appeal the trial court's judgment/
raising the following issues:
(1) Is RDA required to pay to Owners interest on
deposited funds pursuant to paragraphs 1(a)* and 1(d) 2 of
the stipulation?
1.

Section 1(a) reads as follows:
Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of the
Court upon signing of this Order of
Immediate Occupancy the sum of $275/220.00/
being 100% of the appraised value of the
subject property based upon a written
appraisal obtained by plaintiff. While
(continued)

2.

Section 1(d) of the contract states that:
This Order of Occupancy shall not be
effective unless or until/ (1) the ADL is
signed by Lincoln Property and the
(continued)

Aft0302/292-CA
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(2) Did the trial court err in ruling that RDA*s filing
of the condemnation action terminated Tenants1 leasehold
interests# thus depriving Tenants of the right to a full
evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages?
(footnote 1 continued)
retained by the Clerk of the Court, said
funds shall be invested by the Clerk at the
highest interest available for federally
insured accounts. The plaintiff/ however,
agrees and warrants that said funds will
earn interest at an effective rate of 11.5
annual percentage rate for the term of which
they are held by the Clerk of the Court, not
to exceed a period of three years from the
date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and
that any shortfall or difference between the
actual interest earned by virtue of the
Clerk's investment and the 11.5 annual
percentage rate shall be paid by plaintiff
to the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows
upon demand as herein provided. While said
funds are on deposit with the Clerk of the
Court/ all or any part of said funds may be
withdrawn hereafter at the option of
defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows, or
any of them, upon a written demand of Burge,
Barrows and Barrows or their counsel of
record. The withdrawal of all or any part
of said deposited funds by defendants Burge,
Barrows and Barrows shall constitute a
waiver of any and all defenses to the taking
by condemnation of the subject property as
provided in Section 78-34-9/ Utah Code Ann.#
1953/ as amended, except the issue of just
compensation which shall then be the sole
issue reserved for trial.
(footnote 2 continued)
Redevelopment Agency within thirty (30) days
from date hereof, and the sum of $76,450.00
above provided has been paid pursuant to the
terms and provisions herein, or (2) the
defendant landowners have withdrawn all or
part of the $275,220.00 deposited with the
Clerk of the Court as herein provided.

ftftmn9/9Q9_rA
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(3) Are Owners entitled to reimbursement by RDA for
expert witness fees and other trial preparation expenses?
(4) Under the terms of Tenants' lease agreements/ should
Owners be awarded attorney fees for defending against Tenants1
damage claims, or did this right end if and when the filing of
the condemnation action terminated Tenants* leasehold
interests? If Owners were properly awarded attorney fees
against Tenants, was the award reasonable and proper under the
pleadings and circumstances, and adequately supported by the
record?
(5) Are Owners entitled to reimbursement by RDA of costs
and attorney fees on appeal?
(6) Are Owners entitled to reimbursement by Tenants for
attorney fees on appeal because Tenants' appeal is frivolous?
I.

INTEREST ON FUNDS DEPOSITED WITH COURT

Owners claim that the trial court erred in denying their
request for accrued interest on the funds deposited by RDA
pursuant to the stipulation. They assert, instead, that this
document is a sixty-day option contract with the interest
constituting consideration. RDA, on the other hand, interprets
the document as an order of immediate occupancy and argues that
Owners have no claim to the interest because RDA never received
occupancy under the stipulation.
The document at issue is an agreement, stipulated to by
the parties, which was read in open court, adopted by the
court, and entered on August 16, 1985. It conditioned the
granting of RDA's motion for an order of immediate occupancy
upon the occurrence of the following conditions: (1) payment
by RDA to the court clerk of one hundred percent of the
assessed value of the property, $275,220.00; and (2) either (a)
execution by RDA of a property distribution agreement (ADL)
with Lincoln within thirty days, and then, within another
thirty days, payment to Owners of $76,540.00 additional
compensation funded by neighboring landowners; or (b)
withdrawal by Owners of any or all of the funds deposited by
RDA with the court clerk. Owners' withdrawal of any of the
deposited funds would result in their waiver of "any and all
defenses to the taking by condemnation of the subject property
. . . except the issue of just compensation which shall then be
the sole issue reserved for trial."
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In determining whether the August 16, 1985 stipulation is
an order of immediate occupancy or an option contract, we apply
the rules of contract interpretation. We look at the contract
in its entirety, in accordance with its purpose, giving effect
to all of its parts insofar as is possible. Larrabee v. Royal
Dairy Prods. Co., 614 P.2d 160, 162-63 (Utah 1980)- To the
extent that the interpretation of the contract is a question of
law, we need not defer to the trial court's conclusions. Jones
v. Hinkle. 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980). If the document,
itself, is ambiguous, then parol evidence may be used in
arriving at an interpretation. Power Svs. and Controls. Inc.
v. Keith's Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9-10 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). In evaluating parol evidence, however, we defer to the
trial court's factual findings because of its advantaged
position in ascertaining the credibility of witnesses. See
Fashion Place Inv.. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County. 776 P*2d 941, 943

(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

We note that

[i]t is a fundamental rule that in the
construction of contracts the courts may
look not only to the language employed, but
to the subject-matter and the surrounding
circumstances, and may avail themselves of
the same light which the parties possessed
when the contract was made. To ascertain
that intention, regard must be had to the
nature of the instrument itself, the
condition of the parties executing it, and
the objects which they had in view.
Kintner v. Harr. 408 P.2d 487, 494 (Mont. 1965) (citations
omitted); pee also Berman v. Berman. 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
Thus, to assist in interpreting the language of the
contract, we examine the circumstances surrounding the entry of
the document and the purposes behind its execution. At the time
of the hearing, Lincoln was attempting to develop at least the
northern third of Block 57, but could not proceed unless it had
access to a sufficiently large piece of property. RDA had filed
condemnation actions against all Block 57 property owners, but
had not obtained occupancy of much of the property. Five
property owners located on the southern two-thirds of the block
and Owners had filed lawsuits contesting RDA's condemnation
power. RDA had filed an interlocutory appeal contesting an
adverse ruling in its lawsuit against the other five property
owners. At the time of this hearing, that appeal and its
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associated lawsuit were still pending, making it uncertain
whether RDA did, in fact, have the power to condemn property on
Block 57,
Lincoln's commitment to develop Block 57 was contingent upon
its execution, with RDA, of the ADL. Lincoln would not sign the
ADL unless it was certain that RDA could immediately obtain
occupancy of at least the northern third of Block 57. Because of
the uncertainty surrounding RDA's condemnation authority, Lincoln
was rapidly losing interest in pursuing the project at all.
Thus, time was of the essence. Additionally, other adjoining
landowners were eager to sell their property to RDA as soon as
possible because of the rapidly declining property values on
Block 57. Consequently, they were willing to pay Owners some of
the compensation they would have otherwise received for their
property in order to induce Owners to settle with RDA. Thus, the
parties' stipulation was entered into as an attempt to facilitate
RDA's arrangement with Lincoln.
RDA, pursuant to the August 16, 1985 stipulation, deposited
$275,220.00 with the clerk of the court. However, Lincoln
subsequently withdrew from the project, so the ADL was never
executed. Consequently, the court did not enter an order for
immediate occupancy, and RDA never occupied Owners' property
pursuant to the stipulation.
An order of immediate occupancy permits the condemning
authority to occupy property pending a condemnation action. It
is an interlocutory order, entered pendente XjJt£# which only
authorizes the State to take immediate possession until a final
adjudication is held on the merits. Utah State Road Comm'n v.
Fribero, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984).
To grant an order of immediate occupancy under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-34-9 (1987), the court must require, as a condition
precedent, that the condemning authority deposit at least
seventy-five percent of the appraised value of the property it
seeks to condemn with the clerk of the court. The landowner is
then free, at any time, to withdraw the money filed with the
court clerk. If he does, however, he forfeits his right to
challenge the condemning authority1s power to condemn his
property, and may only dispute the final amount of compensation.
This amount may be established pursuant to an evidentiary hearing
separate from the granting of the order of immediate occupancy,
and includes eight percent per annum interest on the difference
between the amount finally awarded and the amount the condemning
agency originally deposited with the court clerk. Interest

10

accrues from the earlier date
authority's taking possession
order of immediate occupancy/
County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83,

of either the condemning
of the property or the entry of the
until the date of judgment, Utah
85 (Utah 1983).

The purpose behind the parties* stipulation was to permit
RDA to immediately occupy Owners' property pending determination
of its condemnation authority and the value of the property.
Like an order of immediate occupancy, the stipulation did not
purport to finally set the amount of compensation Owners should
receive.
The court required two conditions precedent to its granting
of an order of immediate occupancy under the stipulation. The
first condition required RDA to deposit one hundred percent of
the appraised value of the property, twenty-five percent more
than required for an order of immediate occupancy under section
78-34-9. The first alternative under the second condition, that
RDA and Lincoln sign the ADL and then pay Owners additional
compensation, is unique to the stipulation and has no counterpart
under section 78-34-9. However, the second alternative, like the
statute, provides that if Owners were to withdraw the funds, they
would forfeit the right to litigate RDA's condemnation authority.
The stipulation required eleven and one-half percent per
annum interest to be paid upon the entire appraised value of the
property deposited with the court, from the date of the
stipulation to the earlier of either the date of final
determination of the fair market value of the property or the
expiration of three years. Section 78-34-9 only requires that
eight percent interest be paid on the balance of the fair market
value of the property not deposited with the court from the date
of the granting of the order of immediate occupancy or the date
of entry on the property, whichever occurs earlier, to the date
of final determination of the value of the property. Therefore,
the stipulated terms in regard to interest are substantially more
favorable to Owners than statutorily required.
In the stipulation, the court set a sixty-day time limit for
the conditions precedent to occur. This is consistent with the
statute's allowance for the trial court to set reasonable time
limits for compliance with its terms.
In summary, the parties' stipulation closely parallels the
requirements and purpose for an order of immediate occupancy
pursuant to section 78-34-9. It diverges from the statutory
requirements only in terms which are substantially more

ftfi0302/292-CA

11

favorable to Owners than required. We conclude that the
parties incorporated these terms to induce Owners, who were
clearly unwilling otherwise, to enter quickly into the
agreement with RDA.
On the other hand, Owners contend that this stipulation is
really an option agreement for which the accrued interest was
to serve as consideration. This court, relying upon
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 25 (1981), has recently
defined an option contract as a "promise which meets the
requirements for the formation of a contract and limits the
promisor's power to revoke an offer." Property Assistance
Corp. v. Roberts. 768 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 25 (1981)). We
have indicated that:
[t]wo elements exist in such a contract:
(1) an offer to sell, which does not
become a contract until accepted, and (2)
a contract to leave the offer open for a
specified time. Thus, by its terms, an
option contract for real property requires
one offer and acceptance of the exclusive
right to purchase the property and another
offer and acceptance for the actual
transfer of the property.
Id, (citations omitted).
Because the stipulation very closely resembles a statutory
order of immediate occupancy and not an option contract, we
reject Owners* assertion and find that the stipulation should be
interpreted as an order of immediate occupancy.
It is undisputed that the first condition occurred when RDA
deposited one hundred percent of the appraised value of the
property with the court. However, neither alternative of the
second condition occurred. RDA and Lincoln never executed the
ADL and Owners, during the approximately eighty-five days the
funds deposited with the court remained unfrozen, never withdrew
any of the funds. This nonoccurrence of the conditions
discharged RDA's duty to pay Owners the consideration recited
under the stipulation, including interest.
Although this is dispositive of Owners' claim to the accrued
interest, we note additionally that under section 78-34-9, where
there is no entry or occupation of the property by the condemning
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agency, there is no entitlement to interest. See Oregon Short
Line R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732, 735-36 (1905).3
It is undisputed that RDA never occupied Owners' property
pursuant to the stipulation, so Owners are not entitled to
interest.
In summary, we conclude that the interest provided for in
section 1(a) of the parties• stipulation was consideration for
taking possession of the property, not for a sixty-day option
agreement, and that the conditions set forth in paragraph 1(d) of
the stipulation are conditions precedent to enforcement of the
entire agreement, rather than merely to the payment of interest.
II.

BONUS VALUE OF TENANTS* LEASEHOLD INTERESTS

Tenants insist the trial court erred in finding that they
were not entitled to any "bonus value"4 because their "leases
terminated as of the commencement of this action against the
Defendants." They argue that at the time the action was filed,
their leases had approximately thirteen unexpired months, and
that they later renewed the leases for additional five-year
terms. They maintain that they are entitled to bonus value
payments because they would have to pay much more rent elsewhere,
and demand a hearing to determine the amount of bonus value to
which they are entitled.
Owners assert that Tenants9 lease agreements were terminated
as of the date of service of RDA's condemnation complaint, and
that Tenants' lease provisions do not allow for bonus value
payments.
To resolve this issue, we look to the terms of the lease
agreements. In doing so, we follow the same rules of contract
3. Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732
(1905) interprets a previous version of the statute, but the
operative provisions are sufficiently similar to the present
version of the statute for the case to be relevant.
4. Bonus value occurs "whenever the capitalized then fair rental
value for the remaining term of the lease, plus the value of any
renewal right, exceeds the capitalized value of the rental the
lease specifies." Alamo Land and Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 242 U.S.
295, 96 S. Ct. 910, 916 (1976). See also Garibaldi v. Oklahoma
Indus. Fin. Co.. 543 P.2d 555, 558 (Okla. 1975).
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interpretation as specified in section I. The relevant portions
of Tenants' lease agreements read as follows:
In the event said premises, or any part
thereof, or the whole or any part of the
said building shall be taken by right of
eminent domain or shall be taken for any
street or public use or the action of public
authorities after the execution and before
the termination hereof, this Lease may, at
the election of Lessor or Lessee, be
terminated: provided, however, in such
event, Lessee shall be entitled to
compensation for improvements made to said
premises, in an amount equal to the
compensation received by Lessor in respect
thereof and as a result thereof, regardless
of the termination of this Lease.
(Emphasis added.)
By the terms of this lease, either the Lessor or the Lessee
may terminate the lease upon the taking of the premises by the
right of eminent domain. See 51C C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 98
(1968). "The generally accepted rule is that if the condemning
authority takes an estate in fee simple absolute in all of the
real property covered by the lease, the lease thereupon

terminates.-

Peaverton Urban Renewal Agency v» ypning, 53 or.

App. 842, 632 P.2d 1359, 1360 (1981); &£& also Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Bradley, 205 Kan. 242, 468 P.2d 95, 98 (1970);
51C C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 98 (1968). Thus, in a total
taking, any right which the lessee may have to share in the
condemnation award becomes vested at the time of the taking,
absent an agreement to the contrary. Garibaldi v. Oklahoma
Indus. Fin. Co.. 543 P.2d 555, 558 (Okla. 1975); Beaverton
Urban Renewal Agency, 632 P.2d at 1362. The time of the taking
is generally considered to be the time at which the condemning
authority actually takes possession of the property, not the
time at which the initial complaint is served. See Phillips
Petroleum Co., 468 P.2d at 99. Therefore, if not previously
terminated, Tenants1 lease ended on June 7, 1987, the date on
which RDA ultimately took possession of the premises. At this
time, Tenants1 rights to bonus value, if any, became vested.
There is no evidence in the record that either Owners or
Tenants terminated the leases on the date RDA initiated its
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condemnation action. Instead/ Tenants continued to occupy the
premises and Owners continued to receive rent payments from
Tenants. Approximately thirteen months later# on July 31,
1985/ the original lease expired. Tenants remained in
possession after this time# and continued paying rent at the
contract amount to Owners.
Tenants claim that they properly renewed the lease
agreements and that/ because the second five-year term had not
fully elapsed at the time RDA took possession of the premises/
they were entitled to the bonus value of the remaining leases.
Owners/ on the other hand/ argue that Tenants never properly
extended or renewed the lease agreements and were simply
month-to-month tenants who had no bonus value rights.
The renewal provisions of the lease agreements state:
Lessor grants to Lessee
this Lease for a period
after the expiration of
Lease at a rental to be

an option to renew
of Five (5) years
the term of this
negotiated at

least si?ty (60) flays prior to the
expiration Qf thisfrease/with all other
terms and conditions of the renewal lease
to be the?same as those herein. To

exercise this option* Lessee must give
Lessor written notice of intention to
extend at least ninety (90) days before
this lease expires.
(Emphasis added.)
Under the contract/ Tenants were required to give Owners
written notice of their intent to extend the lease at least
ninety days before it expired. Tenants assert that they mailed
notifications of their intent to renew the lease to Owners
during this period of time. However/ they were unable to
produce any evidence at trial that they had done so. Owners
testified that they never received any such notice. Neither
side disputes the facts that Owners never replied to this
alleged notification and that a new rental was not negotiated
between the parties at least sixty days before the lease
terminated. The trial court specifically found that Tenants
had not timely notified Owners of their intent to renew the
lease. We will not set aside the trial court's factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous and against the
clear weight of the evidence or we otherwise reach a definite

1K

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a); Reifl vt Mutual of Qmghg InSt QOt, 776 P.2d 896,
899-900 (Utah ,1989). "Where evidence is controverted, we
assume that the trial judge believed those aspects of the
evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from them that

support his decision.- pyjxenfrChristopher* Architects vf

Elton, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 51 (Ct. App. 1989); see also IFG
Leasing Co. v. Gordon, Hansen, and Nelson, 776 P.2d 607, 617
(Utah 1989). After a review of the record, we do not find the
trial court's determination that Tenants failed to timely renew
the lease to be clearly erroneous.
The lease agreements further state that:
No holding over by Lessee, however long
continued, shall operate to renew or extend
this Lease without Lessor's written
consent. If Lessee holds possession of said
premises after the term of this Lease or any
renewal term thereof, Lessee shall become a
tenant from month to month, at the rent
payable in the last installment during the
last month of the term of this Lease, and
upon the terms herein specified, and shall
continue to be such tenant until the tenancy
shall be terminated by Lessor or until
Lessee shall have given Lessor written
notice of at least one (1) month of Lessee's
intention to terminate the tenancy.
Under this provision, Tenants' holding over of the property
did not create a new lease but resulted only in a
month-to-month tenancy which terminated on February 2, 1987,
when Owners gave Tenants written notice of their intention to
terminate the lease. Tenants' month-to-month tenancy had no
bonus value because they were not entitled to the specified
rental amount for any more than one month at a time.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court in finding that Tenants
had no bonus value under their leases, and that, as a
consequence, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing to
determine the amount of the bonus value.
III. EXPERT WITNESS FEES
AND OTHER TRIAL PREPARATION EXPENSES
Owners appeal the trial court's denial of their request for
reimbursement of expert witness fees and other trial
preparation expenses. They argue that Utah Code Ann.
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§ 11-19-23.9 (1986), which authorizes reimbursement of a
landowner's costs and attorney fees in a condemnation action,
also includes reimbursement for expert witness fees and other
reasonably necessary trial preparation expenses. This is an
issue of first impression in Utah.
Owners argue that they have been deprived of
constitutionally required "just compensation" for the taking of
their property for public use because they have been required
to expend a considerable portion of their award, which was
founded on the fair market value of their property, for the
services of expert witnesses and other reasonably necessary
litigation expenses. They rely on the Florida Supreme Court's
opinion in Pafle County v« Priqham, 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1950) to
support this point:
We might, and do, add thereto the thought
that Section 73.16, Florida Statutes 1941,
F.S.A., which provides "All costs of
proceedings shall be paid by the
petitioner, including a reasonable
attorney's fee . . . "
should be
construed in the light of Section 12 of
our Declaration of Rights, F.S.A., which
declares that private property shall not
be taken "without iust compensation."
(Italics supplied.) When so construed the
language *A11 costs of proceedings . . . "
must be held, in a proper case, to include
fees of expert witnesses for the
defendants. . • .
Since the owner of private property
sought to be condemned is forced into
court by one to whom he owes no
obligation, it cannot be said that he has
received "just compensation" for his
property if he is compelled to pay out of
his own pocket the expenses of
establishing the fair value of the
property, which expenses in some cases
could conceivably exceed such value.
Dade County, 47 So. 2d at 604-05.
Although the logic of the Florida court's interpretation
of "just compensation" under Florida constitutional provisions
appeals to a sense of fairness, it is well settled that "just

AS0302/292-CA

17

compensation- under the federal constitution is not so
inclusive. Under the federal constitution, w[j]ust
compensation is for the property and not to the owner.
As a
result, indirect costs to the property owner caused by the
taking of his land are generally not part of the just
compensation to which he is constitutionally entitled." United
St9teS v, 3QdC9W CQt, 440 U.S. 202, 203, 99 S. Ct. 1066,
1066-67 (1979) (quoting Mononaahela Navigation Co. v. United
States, 148 U.S. 312, 326, 13 S. Ct. 622, 626, 37 L.Ed. 463
(1893)). Therefore, attorney fees and other necessary
expenses, including expert witness fees, are non-compensable as
-just compensation.- 9.88 Acres of Land v. State ex. rel.
Highway Deo't, 274 A.2d 139, 140-41 (Del. 1971); see also
County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz. 98 Cal. Rptr. 454, 490 P.2d
1142, 1147 (1971); State v. Davis. 499 P.2d 663, 667 (Haw.
1972). Instead, compensation for such costs incurred by a
landowner in a condemnation action is a matter of legislative
prerogative and must be provided for by statute.7 Department
of Transp. v. Winston Container Co.. 263 S.E.2d 830, 831 (N.C.

ct. App. 1980); £££ hiso Schwartz vt western Power & ggs Cot,
208 Kan. 844, 494 P.2d 1113, 1116-17 (1972); Gavlord v. State
ex rel. Deo't of Highways, 540 P.2d 558, 562 (Okla. 1975).
Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9 (1986), which provides for
reimbursement of the landowner's expenditures in a condemnation
action, provides, in part:
Within the project area an agency may:

(2) acquire real property by eminent
domain; but when the power of eminent domain
is exercised under the provisions of the
chapter and the party whose property is
affected contests the matter in the district

7. The Florida Supreme Court in Dade County v. Brioham. 47 So.
2d 602 (Fla. 1950), interpreted its state constitutional
provision for just compensation far more inclusively than the
federal constitutional provision, finding that just
compensation essentially includes all the landowners expenses
incurred in defending a condemnation action, including expert
witness fees. Because Owners have not specifically invoked our
analogous constitutional provisions and have not briefed the
issue of the extent of protection afforded to landowners under
this provision, we do not address its interpretation in this
opinion. Sfis state v. John. 770 P.2d 994, 997 (Utah 1989);
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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court, the court may, in cases where the
amount of the award exceeds the amount
offered, award in addition to his just
compensation, costs, including a
reasonable attorney's fee as determined by
the court. The court, or jury in cases
tried before a jury, may also award a
reasonable sum as compensation for the
costs and expenses, if any, of relocating
the owner whose property is acquired or a
party conducting a business on such
acquired property.
In the present case, RDA acquired Owners' property by
eminent domain. Owners contested the matter in district court,
and the amount awarded Owners exceeded the amount initially
offered to Owners by RDA. Therefore, under section 11-19-23.9,
the court mav award to Owners, "in addition to [their] just
compensation, costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee as
determined by the court." I$l. We note that the award of costs
under this section is permissive and discretionary with the
court, Redevelopment Agency of R O Y V. Jones# 743 p.2d 1233,
1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), so Owners are not unquestionably
entitled to such an award.
We also note that section 11-19-23.9 does not define the
term "costs." Owners, in an attempt to define the term
"costs," cite Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-34-16 and -19 (1986), which
provide for full reimbursement of all reasonable and necessary
expenses actually incurred by a condemnee. These sections are
not helpful because neither is applicable to the present case:
Section 78-34-16 refers to a condemnation action which is filed
and then abandoned by the condemning agency, while section
78-34-19 applies to a concluded condemnation action in which
the condemning authority fails to commence or complete
construction on the subject property within a reasonable time.
Further, the language authorizing the reimbursement in these
statutes is far more inclusive than the term "costs." In
section 78-34-16, the condemnee is to be reimbursed "in full
for all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by
condemnee because of the filing of the action by condemner,
including attorneys fees," and in section 78-34-19(2), for "all
reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by the
condemnee including attorney fees."
The California court, in construing its condemnation
statute, similarly observed that the statute did not specify
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what items may be included as costs. It then ruled that costs
are the same as those recoverable in ordinary civil actions.
People v. Bowman, 343 P.2d 267, 269 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959). Nevada has approved the same construction in
determining what costs are allowed under its condemnation
statute. Andrews v. Kingsbury Gen. Improvement Dist. No. 2,
436 P.2d 813, 814-15 (Nev. 1968). We, likewise, approve the
same construction.
Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does
not define Ncosts.H However, the generally accepted definition
of HcostsM under this rule includes:
. . . those fees which are required to
be paid to the court and to witnesses, and
for which the statutes authorize to be
included in the judgment.
There is a distinction to be understood
between the legitimate and taxable "costs"
and other "expenses" of litigation which may
be ever so necessary, but are not properly
taxable as costs. Consistent with that
distinction', the courts hold that expert
witnesses cannot be awarded extra
compensation unless the statute expressly so
provides.
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980) (footnotes
omitted). Section 11-19-23.9 authorizes compensation for costs
and attorney fees, but does not expressly provide for
compensation for expert witnesses. We, therefore, conclude that
expert witness fees are not reimbursable "costs." Consequently,
the trial court ruled correctly in refusing to award Owners
compensation for expert witness fees incurred in defending this
condemnation action. We agree, however, with the Delaware
court: "If an adjustment in the law of eminent domain is
dictated by fairness in this connection, it is a matter for
consideration and action by the [legislature]." 9,88 Acres <?f
Land, 274 A.2d at 140.
IV.
A.

ATTORNEY FEES

Tenants* Liability For Owners" Attorney Fees

Tenants allege that the trial court erred in requiring them
to pay attorney fees incurred by Owners in defending against
their claims. They reason that: (1) they are not liable under
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the lease agreements to pay the attorney fees because Owners
deemed the lease void for purposes of determining their
entitlement to bonus value and, thus, they cannot deem it to be
valid for purposes of assessing attorney fees; and (2) Owners'
claim for attorney fees was not raised in the pleadings and
Tenants did not consent to amend the pleadings. Owners, however,
contend that they are entitled to attorney fees both at the trial
level and on appeal for issues raised by Tenants. Owners also
demand attorney fees on appeal of its claims against RDA.
Tenants' Liability Under The Lease Agreement
M

In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by
statute or by contract." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d
985, 988 (Utah 1988)t If authorized by contract, then attorney
fees are allowed only in accordance with the terms of the
contract. Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d
643, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The portion of the lease agreements authorizing payment of
attorney fees reads as follows:
Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and
attorney's fees and expenses that shall
arise from enforcing the terms and
provisions of this lease.
Tenants claimed compensation for bonus value based upon
their purported renewal of the lease for five years. However,
they failed to comply with the conditions of the lease to
effectively exercise their option to renew, and the lease
precluded them from receiving bonus value payments. Owners
successfully resisted their claim for compensation on the
grounds that it was $ violation of the "terms and provisions of
this lease." Thus, the Owners are contractually entitled to
collect attorney fees and expenses incurred in defending
against Tenants' claims because they were enforcing the lease
terms.
Tenants, relying upon BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d
456, 458 (Utah 1978), argue that a party who deems a contract
void for one purpose cannot subsequently rely upon that
contract to support another purpose. The circumstances in BLT
Investment, however, are not applicable to the present case.
One of the parties in BLT Investment rescinded a contract and
then relied upon the same contract to attempt to collect
attorney fees from the other party. Here, even though
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Tenants' five-year lease term had expired/ the parties
continued to maintain a landlord-tenant relationship on a
month-to-month tenancy, as provided for in the original lease,
until owners terminated the lease. However, Owners did not
rescind the contract or declare it void. Consequently, the
parties were entitled to rely upon the contractual terms,
including the provisron for attorney fees, to determine their
respective rights and responsibilities. See Cobabe v.
Crawford, 117 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 26 (Ct. App. 1989).
Tenants' Liability Under The Pleadings
Tenants also argue that they are not liable for Owners*
attorney fees, pursuant to Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, because Owners did not request attorney fees
in their pleadings but only raised them in their motion for
summary judgment.5 At trial, Tenants requested that Owners'
affidavits supporting their requested fees not be admitted into
evidence. The court denied Tenants' request, admitted both
Owners' and Tenants' affidavits regarding attorney fees, and
ruled that the pleadings could be amended to include attorney
fees.
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows
pleadings to be amen led to conform to the evidence presented
and the issues actually litigated by the parties. This rule,
in part, states that!
If evidence is objected to at the trial on
the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court
may allow the pleadings to be amended when
the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court
that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or
defense upon the merits.
Thus, pleadings may be amended even when evidence is objected
to at trial on the ground that it raises issues not framed by
the pleadings,fifififtlsoLloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Wav

5. Owners did not file a cross-claim for attorney fees in
their answer to RDA's condemnation complaint because they filed
their answer before Tenants asserted their claim. Tenants were
put on notice that Owners were seeking attorney fees from them
in Owners' motion for summary judgment.
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Mktcr.. Ltd.. 753 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "Although
Rule 15 . . . tends to favor the granting of leave to amend, the
matter remains in the sound discretion of the trial court."
Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984) (footnote
omitted). Therefore, the trial court was within its discretion
in concluding that the pleadings could be amended to include
attorney fees,6 even though not initially raised in the
pleadings.
Amount of Attorney Fee Award at the Trial Level
Tenants argue that the trial court improperly awarded Owners
attorney fees because counsel's affidavit, submitted by Owners,
was insufficient to support the award.
The calculation of reasonable attorney fees is within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned
absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank,
764 P.2d at 988. However, an award made without adequate
supporting evidence constitutes an abuse of
discretion and must be overruled. !£.; Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d
1226, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
While findings of fact are unnecessary in connection with
summary judgment decisions, a summary judgment is improper when
material facts are disputed. See Taylor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770
P.2d 163, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "[W]here attorney fees are
awarded to a prevailing party on summary judgment, the
undisputed, material facts must establish, as a matter of law,
that (1) the party is entitled to the award, and (2) the amount
awarded is reasonable.H !£. at 169.
Here, while summary judgment was appropriate in determining
that Owners were entitled to an award of attorney fees, the facts
are controverted as to the reasonableness of the award.

6.

The trial court's conclusion of law No. 8 reads:
The presentation of the merits of this
action will be subserved by amending the
pleadings to raise the issues and to conform
to the evidence as to claims by the owners
against the tenants, which claims are set
forth in the owners1 Motion for Summary
Judgment and which should become part of the
issues made by the pleadings herein by way
of owners' cross-claim against the tenants.
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Owners' attorney fee affidavits were quite detailed,
specifying the work actually performed in connection with the
litigation of issues raised by Tenants, and the number of hours
required to perform this work. On the basis of these
affidavits, Owners requested an award of between $5,000.00 and
$13,300.00. However, Tenants' attorney filed an opposing
affidavit which alleged that the issues involved were not
complex, required little research, and should have taken little
time. He stated tha': Owners should, therefore, be awarded no
more than $500.00 to $1000.00 for these fees.
It takes only one competent sworn statement to dispute the
averments on the other side of the controversy and create an
issue of fact. Reeves v. Geiav Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d
636, 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). We find that Tenants'
attorney's affidavit sufficiently disputes Owners' averments of
fact to create an issue of fact. See D&L Supply v. Saurini,
775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (adverse party must set forth
specific facts in an affidavit or otherwise to raise any issue
of fact); Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d
693, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (the party opposing summary
judgment must set forth specific facts in an affidavit that
would be admissible as evidence).
Because there is a dispute as to a material fact, we
reverse the lower court's determination of the amount of
attorney fees and remand for trial on that issue. The court
should make factual findings to support its award. Reeves, 764
P.2d at 640; Cabreral 694 P.2d at 625.
Attorney Fees for Appeal
Owners maintain that they are entitled to attorney fees
for defending against Tenants' appeal on the grounds that
Tenants' appeal is frivolous. While we agree that Tenants'
issues on appeal are wholly without merit, we do not reach the
issue of whether or not they are frivolous.
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that
the contractual obligation to pay
attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a
contract should include those incurred on
appeal. • • •
. . . We therefore adopt the rule of
law that y provision for payment of
attorney's fees in a contract includes
attorney fees incurred by the prevailing
party on appeal as well as at trial, if
the action is brought to enforce the
contract. . . .
880302/292-CA
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Management

Servs.

v. Development Assocs..

617 P.2d

406,

408-09

(Utah 1980) (footnote omitted); see also Dixon v. Stoddard, 765
P.2d 879# 881,(Utah 1988); Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408# 412
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Because Tenants1 issues on appeal all
dealt with the interpretation and enforcement of Tenants1 lease
agreements, Owners are entitled to reimbursement by Tenants of
their attorney fees incurred on appeal. See Cobabe v.
Crawford. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27. We remand for purposes of
determining the amount of a reasonable attorney fee.
B.

RDA's Liability For Owner's Attorney
Fees Incurred on Appeal

Owners argue that because Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9
(1986) authorizes an award of attorney fees to condemnees, RDA
should be be ordered to pay Owners' attorney fees necessarily
incurred on appeal. Rule 34(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals, however, states that "if a judgment or order is
affirmed/ costs [including attorneys' fees] shall be taxed
against the appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment
or order is reversed/ costs shall be taxed against the
respondent unless otherwise ordered."
Owners appealed the trial court's decision in RDA's favor
on two major issues: (1) Owners' entitlement to interest paid
into the court clerk's office pursuant to the August 16/ 1985
stipulation, and (2) reimbursement for expert witness fees
under Utatr-€ode Ann. § 11-34-29.9. We affirm the trial court's
judaKr^nt on Jboth of/these^Psues. Therefore/ Owners are not
entitled to/attorney f^e^fm appeal.

tfegnal W. Garff# Judg

WELCONCUR:

fat m* 3tf&*&4J
JudithW. Billings/ Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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FILED IN CUE«K*S ornce
6*11 Uka County, Utah
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AUG IS 1985
Harold A. Hintze
Special Counsel for Plaintiff
2230 University Parkway
Suite 9E
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-9300
William D. Oswald
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN
57 West 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-7751
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, a public
entity,
Plaintiff,
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE
OCCUPANCY

vs.
JUNIATA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT
G. BARROWS; BEATRICE
IRENE BARROWS; ELLEN K.
DASKALAS, an individual,
dba THE PAWN SHOP, THE PAWN
SHOP, a Utah Corporation;
JAMES ANDERSON, an individual, dba JIM'S RIBS;
TERRY PANTELAKIS, an individual, dba AAA JEWELERS
AND LOANS; and LOANS AND
SALES, INC., a Utah Corporation;

Civil No. C85-4017

JUDGE: Hon. Homer F,
Wilkinson

Defendants.

Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate
Occupancy and Defendant Burge, Barrows and Barrows'
Motion came on for a hearing pursuant to notice before

EXHIBIT,

e>

oo°'

- 2 The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge on
August 13, 1985 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiff being
represented by Harold A. Hintze, Esq. and William D.
Oswald, Esq., and Michael Chitwood Executive Director of
the Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency being present, the
defendants Juniata Irene Burge, Beatrice Irene Barrows
and Robert G. Barrows being present and represented by
John T. Evans, Esq. the defendants Ellen K. Daskalas, an
individual, dba The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James
Anderson, an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry
Pantelakis, an individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans,
and Loans and Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation, neither
appearing personally nor by and through their attorney
of record Jerome Moody, Esq., said defendants having
been served timely notice of said Motions but having
heretofore filed a Stipulation for Immediate Occupancy
which is on file herein, and Ray Zoll representing
himself as a property owner and as attorney for the
following land owners in Block 57, Plat "A", Salt Lake
City Survey and located at 235 South Main Street, David
Mortensen, Erv Wilfred, 235 South Main Associates, 235
South Main, Inc., Egan and Associates, and Harold Egan,
the parties and other land owners having reached an open
court stipulation which has been recited and agreed to
orally before the Court on August 13, 1985, said
Stipulation to be the basis of an Order of Immediate
Occupancy.

t>ty

- 3 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate

Occupancy of the following described property, to-wit:
Beginning at a point 166 feet west of the
northeast Corner of Lot 6, Block 57, Plat
"A" , Salt Lake City Survey, and running
thence east 69 feet to the center of a 17
inch party wall and which point is further
evidenced by a metal plug inserted in the
sidewalk
north
of
said
wall
by
R.W.
Sorensen, licensed surveyor; thence south
110 feet; thence west 68 feet; thence south
55 feet; thence west 1 foot; thence north
165 feet to the point of beginning.
may be granted subject to and upon the following terms
and provisions:
(a)

Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of

the Court upon signing of this Order of Immediate
Occupancy the sum of $275,220.00, being 100% of the
appraised value of the subject property based upon a
written appraisal obtained by plaintiff.

While retained

by the Clerk of the Court, said funds shall be invested
by the Clerk at the highest interest rate available for
federally insured accounts.

The plaintiff, however,

agrees and warrants that said funds will earn interest
at an effective rate of 11.5 annual percentage rate for
the term of which they are held by the Clerk of the
Court, not to exceed a period of three years from the
date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and that any

- 4 shortfall or difference between the actual interest
earned by virtue of the Clerk's investment and the 11.5
annual percentage rate shall be paid by the plaintiff to
the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows upon demand as
herein provided. While said funds are on deposit with
the Clerk of the Court, all or any part of said funds
may be withdrawn hereafter at the option of defendants
Burge, Barrows and Barrows, or any of them, upon a
written demand of Burge, Barrows and Barrows or their
counsel of record.

The withdrawal of all or any part of

said deposited funds by defendants Burge, Barrows and
Barrows shall constitute a waiver of any and all
defenses to the taking by condemnation of the subject
property as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, except the issue of just
compensation which shall then be the sole issue reserved
for trial.
(b)

On entry of this Order of Immediate

Occupancy, the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City
shall submit within ten (10) days of the date hereof to
Lincoln Property Company N.C., Inc. (Lincoln) for
signature an Agreement for Distribution of Land for
Private Development (ADL).

Said ADL must be fully

executed by the Redevelopment Agency and Lincoln within
thirty (30) days from date hereof.

Within thirty (30)

days from execution of the ADL by Lincoln, the

0'-

- 5Redevelopment Agency shall pay Burge, Barrows and
Barrows $76,450.00 as hereinafter described and exercise
its option to purchase and the owners shall sell the
property located at 235 South Main Street, owned by
Mountain States Creamery Company and David Mortensen
pursuant to the written Offer to Purchase dated April 5,
1985 and the Extension Agreement extending said Offer to
sixty (60) days from date hereof.

The Redevelopment

Agency in disbursement of the purchase price for

said

Mortensen property may withhold, and Mortensen
authorizes the Redevelopment Agency to pay to and assign
to the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows from said
funds, and solely from said funds, the sum of $76,450.00
to be paid to defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows upon
the closing of the Redevelopment Agency's acquisition of
David Mortensen*s interest in the property located at
235 South Main Street, but not to exceed thirty (30)
days from the date Lincoln executes the ADL.

Said sum

of $76,450.00 shall be paid as additional compensation
over and above any just compensation ultimately found by
the court or jury in this case to be the fair market
value of the property being condemned herein and the
receipt of said funds shall not be an offset or
deduction from said just compensation and the receipt of
the same shall not be disclosed to the jury.

Upon

payment to defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows of the

- 6 sum of $76,450.00, said defendants by receipt thereof,
waive any and all defenses to the taking by condemnation
of the subject property in the same manner as would
occur by withdrawal of funds deposited with the Clerk of
the Court pursuant to the aforementioned Section
78-34-9.
(c)

David Mortensen's obligation in

regards to the payment of the aforementioned $76,450.00
is solely conditioned upon the Redevelopment Agency's
election to exercise its right of acceptance under the
aforementioned Offer to Purchase the property at 235
South Main Street and if the fund from which this
partial assignment has been made does not come into
existence and Mortensen is not paid at least $76,450.00
or entitled to immediate payment thereof by virtue of
the fact that the Offer to Purchase is not consummated
for any reason, said Mortensen shall have absolutely no
liability to make any payments to the defendants Burge,
Barrows and Barrows by virtue of this Order.
(d)

This Order of Occupancy shall not be

effective unless or until, (1) the ADL is signed by
Lincoln Property and the Redevelopment Agency within
thirty (30) days from date hereof, and the sum of
$76,450.00 above provided has been paid pursuant to the
terms and provisions herein, or (2) the defendant land
owners have withdrawn all or part of the $275,220.00

- 7 deposited with the Clerk of the Court as herein
provided.
(e)

Based upon the terms and conditions of

the oral Stipulation made to the Court, the Court does
hereby enter an Order of Immediate Occupancy that the
subject property is sought for uses by the public in
connection with and as part of a redevelopment project
authorized and approved by the City Council of Salt Lake
City and the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, and
the plaintiff is authorized to take immediate possession
of said property and continue in possession of the same
pending further hearing and trial on the issue of just
compensation which, subject to the terms and provisions
herein, is the only issue which may be raised in this
action as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.

Plaintiff or its agents may

do such work thereon as may be required for the purposes
for which said property is sought to be condemned
including, but not limited to, demolition of existing
improvements and construction of new improvements or
structures, without interference by defendants or any of
defendants' partners, agents, or employees, however, no
demolition of the existing building, collecting of rent,
or eviction of existing tenants pursuant to said Order
of Immediate Occupancy will occur until the defendants
have either withdrawn part or all of the $275,220.00

- 8 deposited with the Clerk of the Court as provided herein
or have received payment from David Mortensen through
the Redevelopment Agency of the $76,450.00 as herein
provided.
2.

The Redevelopment Agency stipulates to

extend the offers for purchase of the condominium
properties located at 235 South Main Street, which
include the owners represented herein by B. Ray Zoll,
for sixty (60) days from the date hereof.
3.

Defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows1

Motion in regards to the manner of disbursement of funds
to be deposited with the Clerk as above described came
on for a hearing and no one appearing in opposition
thereto, the Court being duly advised in the premises
and good cause appearing therefore, now orders that
under the terms of occupancy by the tenant-defendants,
to-wit:

Ellen K. Daskalas, an individual, dba The Pawn

Shop, The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James Anderson,
an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry Pantelakis, an
individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans, and Loans and
Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation of the subject premises,
said tenants have no right or claim to the proceeds to
be awarded in this action as just compensation and that
all sums paid pursuant to this Order of Immediate
Occupancy and by virtue of the final judgment of just
compensation shall be the sole property of, and are to

- 9 be paid directly to the owner-defendants, to-wit:
Juniata Irene Burge, Robert G. Barrows and Beatrice
Irene Barrows without notice to or approval by the
tenant-defendants.
Dated this /6

day of August, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

omer F. Wilkinson
District Court Judge
APROVED AS TO FROM:

ATTEST
H. DIXON H I N J L E Y

FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN
Deputy Clerk

William D. Oswald
Attorney for Plaintiff
Redevelopment Agency of Salt
Lake City

milEvans
( c (/wr?
Ajttdrney f o r Defendants
ju$ge, Barrows and Barrows

B. Raj^Zoll
Attorney for/Defeehdants
Mortensen, Wrilfred, 235 South
Main Associates, 235 South Main,
Inc., Egan and Associates, and Egan
and Pro Se
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